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Abstract 
We introduce a general representation of large­
population games in which each player's influ­
ence on the others is centralized and limited, but 
may otherwise be arbitrary. This representation 
significantly generalizes the class known as con­
gestion games in a natural way. Our main results 
are provably correct and efficient algorithms for 
computing and learning approximate Nash equi­
libria in this general framework. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
We introduce a compact representation for single-stage ma­
trix games with many players. In this representation, each 
player is influenced by the actions of all others, but only 
through a global summarization function. Each player's 
payoff is an arbitrary function of their own action and the 
value of the summarization function, which is determined 
by the population joint play. This representation of large­
population games may be exponentially more succinct that 
the naive matrix form, and here we prove that vast com­
putational savings can be realized as well. A natural ex­
ample of such games is voting scenarios (a special case in 
which the summarization function is both linear and sym­
metric), where each player's payoff depends only on their 
own vote and the outcome of the popular election, but not 
on the details of exactly how every citizen voted. Certain 
large-population financial market and auction models are 
also natural candidates. As discussed below, summariza­
tion games generalize a number of existing representations 
in the game theory literature, such as congestion games. 
We make the natural assumption of bounded influence -
that is, that no player can unilaterally induce arbitrarily 
large changes in the value of the summarization function. 
(Voting is a simple example of bounded influence.) Un­
der only this assumption and a bound on the derivatives of 
the private individual payoff functions (both of which ap­
pear to be necessary), we give an algorithm for efficiently 
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computing approximate Nash equilibria, which interest­
ingly always outputs pure approximate equilibria. We also 
prove that a simple variant of distributed smoothed best­
response dynamics will quickly converge to (learn) an ap­
proximate equilibrium for any linear summarization func­
tion. These algorithms run in time polynomial in the num­
ber of players and the approximation quality parameter, and 
are among the few examples of provably efficient Nash 
computation and learning algorithms for broad classes of 
large-population games. 
2 RELATED WORK 
A closely related body of work is the literature on games 
known as congestion games (Rosenthal [1973]) or exact 
potential games (Monderer and Shapley [1996]), which are 
known to be equivalent. In congestion games and their gen­
eralizations, players compete for a central resource or re­
sources, and each player's payoff is a (decreasing) function 
of the number of players selecting the resources. An ex­
ample is the well-studied Santa Fe Bar problem, where pa­
trons of a local bar receive positive payoff if their numbers 
are sufficiently low, negative payoff if they exceed capac­
ity, and players who stay home receive 0 payoff. Single­
resource congestion games can be viewed as summariza­
tion games in which the global summarization is symmet­
ric -that is, dependent only on the total number of play­
ers selecting the resource. In the current work we allow the 
summarization function to be both non-symmetric and non­
linear, but our results can also be viewed as a contribution 
to the congestion game literature. While a fair amount is 
understood about the mathematical properties of equilibria 
in congestion games (such as the existence of pure equilib­
ria), and there has been a great deal of recent experimen­
tal simulation (see, for example, Greenwald et a!. [2001]), 
there seems to be relatively little work providing provably 
efficient and correct algorithms for computing and learning 
equilibria. 
We also view the proposed representation and algorithms 
as complementary to recent work on compact undirected 
graphical models for multi-player games (Kearns et a!. 
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[2001], Littman et al. [2002], Vickrey and Koller [2002]). 
While those works emphasize large-population games in 
which each player is strongly influenced by a small num­
ber of others, the current work focuses on games in which 
each player is weakly influenced by all others. This is 
analogous to the two main cases of tractable inference in 
Bayesian networks, where the polytree algorithm provides 
an algorithm for sparse networks, and variational algo­
rithms yield approximate inference in dense networks with 
small-influence parametric CPTs. 
3 DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION 
We begin with the standard definitions for multiplayer ma­
trix games. An n-player, two-action 1 game is defined by 
a set of n matrices Mi (1 � i � n), each with n in­
dices. The entry M;(x1, ... ,xn) = Mi(x) specifies the 
payoff to player i when the joint action of the n players is 
x E { 0, 1} n Thus, each Mi has 2n entries. We shall assume 
all payoffs are bounded in absolute value by I. 
The actions 0 and I are the pure strategies of each player, 
while a mixed strategy for player i is given by the proba­
bility Pi E [0, 1] that the player will play 0. For any joint 
mixed strategy, given by a product distribution p, we define 
the expected payoff to player i as Mi(PJ = Ex-v[Mi(x)], 
where x � p indicates that each XJ is 0 with probability PJ 
and I with probability 1 - PJ. 
We use P[ i : p;] to denote the vector which is the same as 
p except in the ith component, where the value has been 
changed top;. A Nash equilibrium for the game is a mixed 
strategy p such that for any player i, and for any value 
p; E [0, 1], Mi(PJ 2: Mi(P[i : p:J). (We say that pi is a best 
response to the rest of p.) In other words, no player can im­
prove their expected payoff by deviating unilaterally from 
a Nash equilibrium. The classic theorem of Nash [1951] 
states that for any game, there exists a Nash equilibrium in 
the space of joint mixed strategies. 
We will also use a straightforward definition for approxi­
mate Nash equilibria. An £-Nash equilibrium is a mixed 
strategy p such that for any player i, and for any value 
p; E [0, 1], Mi(PJ + £ 2: Mi(P[i : p:J). (We say that Pi 
is an £-best response to the rest of p.) Thus, no player can 
improve their expected payoff by more than £ by deviating 
unilaterally from an approximate Nash equilibrium. 
As in Kearns et al. [200 I], our goal is to introduce a nat­
ural new representation for large multiplayer games that is 
considerably more compact than the classical tabular form, 
which grows exponentially in the number of players. How­
ever, rather than succinctly capturing games in which each 
player has a small number of possibly strong "local" influ­
ences, our interest here is at the other extreme - where 
each player is influenced by all of the others in a large pop-
1 We describe our results for the two-action case. The general­
ization to multiple actions is straightforward. 
ulation, but no single player has a dominant influence on 
any other. 
The first element of this new representation is a population 
summarization function that we shall denote S ( x). As dis­
cussed in the introduction, a natural example might be the 
voting summarization function S(x) = (1/n) 2::�=1 xi, but 
here we explicitly allow S to be asymmetric and non-linear. 
We shall assume without loss of generality that the range of 
S is [0, 1]. The central idea is that in a multiplayer game 
in which the joint pure play is x, the payoffs to any player 
i will be a function of only his own action Xi, and the two 
values S(x[i : OJ) and S(x[i : 1]). We view these two 
values as summarizing for each player all that they need to 
know about the joint behavior in order to decide how to act. 
Note that one of these two values (namely, S(x[i : xi])) is 
simply S(x). 
A natural question is why we provide each player with the 
two values S(x[i : OJ) and S(x[i : 1]), rather than simply 
the single value S ( x). The reason is that in many natu­
ral cases, the single-value model may lead to situations in 
which players do not have sufficient global information to 
determine the effects of their own actions, or even compute 
their best responses, since the value S(x) alone may not 
determine the effect on S of changing Xi. As an example, 
suppose that s ( x) reports the fraction of players that are 
playing the majority value, without specifying whether the 
majority value is 0 or I, and that i is a player whose pay­
off increases with the value of S (that is, i is a consensus­
builder). Then for any given value of S(x), i cannot de­
termine whether he should change his play from Xi in or­
der to build greater consensus. If he is provided with both 
S(x[i : OJ) and S(x[i : 1]), he can directly see the im­
pact on S of his own actions (but not that of others), and 
can at least always compute his own best response to any 
fixed pure joint play x. We note, however, that the results 
we will give shall render this distinction between receiving 
one or both values largely a technicality, and that the reader 
may informally think of the players as receiving the single 
summarizing value S ( x). 
Before moving on to the payoff functions for the individ­
ual players, we first discuss restrictions on S that we shall 
assume. Recall that our goal is to model settings in which 
every player's payoff may depend on every other player's 
move, but in a way that the influences are bounded. For 
a fixed summarization function S ,  we formally define the 
influence of player i by 
Ti = max {IS(x[i: OJ)- S(x[i: 1])1}. iE{0,1}" 
The influence measures the greatest change player i can 
ever (unilaterally) effect in the summarization function. We 
say that the influence of S is bounded by T if Ti ::; T 
for all players i. In keeping with our motivation, we shall 
be studying the computational benefits that can arise from 
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multiplayer games with bounded influence summarization 
functions. Note that since we assume the range of S is 
[0, 1], the influence is always bounded by I; however, if 
there are n players, in many natural bounded-influence set­
tings the maximum influence will be on the order of 1/n (as 
in voting), or at least some function diminishing with n. 
Finally, we discuss the individual payoff functions. Here 
we simply assume that each player i possesses separate 
payoff functions for their two actions, :Fj and :Fi. If the 
pure actions of the other n - 1 players are given by the 
vector x (xi is irrelevant here) the payoff to i for playing 0 
is defined to be :Fj(S(x[i: 0])), and the payoff to player 
i for playing 1 is defined to be :Ft(S(x[i : 1])). Thus, for 
any joint play x, each player is told what values their two 
actions will yield for the population summarization func­
tion, and has private payoff functions indicating their own 
reward for each resulting value. We assume that the Ft 
are real-valued functions mapping [0, 1] to [0, 1]. We shall 
also assume that all the payoff functions are continuous and 
have bounded derivatives. 
Note that even though the summarization function S has 
bounded influence, and thus a player's action can have only 
bounded effect on the payoffs to others, it can have dra­
matic effect on his own payoffs, since Fj and :Ff may as­
sume quite different values for any mixed strategy (despite 
the bounds on their derivatives). We feel this is a natural 
model for many large-population settings, where subjective 
(private) regret over actions may be unrelated to the (small) 
influence an individual has over global quantities. For in­
stance, a staunch democrat might personally find voting for 
a republican candidate quite distasteful, even though this 
individual action might have little or no effect on the over­
all election. It is their private payoff functions that makes 
individuals "care" about their actions in a large population 
where the global effects of any single player are negligible. 
We shall assume throughout that the summarization func­
tion S and all the payoff functions Ft can be efficiently 
computed on any given input; formally, we will assume 
such a computation takes unit time. Thus, the tuple g = 
(S, {(F0,:Fi)}j=1), which we shall call a (large popu­
lation) summarization game, is a representation of an n­
player game that may be considerably more compact than 
its generic matrix representation. We say that g is a ( T, p )­
summarization game if the influence of S is bounded by T, 
and the derivatives of all Ft are bounded by p. 
Two final remarks on the definition of a summarization 
game are in order. First, note that the representation is 
entirely general: by making the summarization and pay­
off functions sufficiently complex, any n-player game can 
be represented. If S outputs enough information to recon­
struct its input (for example, by computing a weighted sum 
of its inputs, where the weight of bit Xi is 2-i), and the 
payoff functions simply interpolate the values of the orig-
ina! game matrices for player i, the original game is ex­
actly represented. However, in such cases we will not have 
small influence and derivatives, and our results will natu­
rally degrade. It is only for bounded influence and deriva­
tive games, which seem to have wide applicability, that our 
results are interesting. Second, we note that if we view 
the summarization function as being defined for every in­
put length n (as in voting) and fixed, and the continuous 
payoff functions as being fixed, then summarization games 
naturally represent games with an arbitrarily large or grow­
ing number of players, and our results will shed light on 
computing and learning equilibria in the limit of large pop­
ulations. 
The results in this paper describe efficient algorithms for 
computing and learning approximate Nash equilibria in 
summarization games, and provide rates of convergence as 
a function of summarization influence, payoff derivatives, 
and population size. We now turn to the technical develop­
ment. 
4 COMPUTING EQUILIBRIA 
The first of our two main results is an efficient algorithm 
for computing approximate Nash equilibria in bounded­
influence summarization games: 
Theorem 1 There is an algorithm SummNash that takes 
as input any t > 0 and any (T, p)-summarization game 
g = (S, {(Fj,:Ff)}j=1) over n players, and outputs an 
O(t + Tp)-Nash equilibrium for Q. Furthermore, this ap­
proximate equilibrium will be a pure (deterministic) joint 
strategy. The running time ofSummNash is polynomial in 
n, 1/t, and p. 
Before presenting the proof, let us briefly interpret the re­
sult. First, the accuracy parameter t is an input to the al­
gorithm, and thus can be made arbitrarily small at the ex­
pense of the polynomial dependence on 1/ t of the running 
time. As for the T p term in the approximation quality, it is 
natural to think of the derivative bound p as being a fixed 
constant, while the influence bound T is some diminishing 
function of the number of players n - that is, individuals 
have relatively smooth payoffs independent of population 
size, while their individual influence on the summarization 
function shrinks as the population grows. Under such cir­
cumstances, Theorem I yields an algorithm that will com­
pute arbitrarily good approximations to equilibria as the 
population increases. 
The proof of Theorem 1 and the associated algorithm will 
be developed in a series of lemmas. Our first step is 
to approximate the continuous, bounded-derivative indi­
vidual payoff functions Ft by piecewise constant (step) 
functions ft. For a given resolution a (to be deter­
mined by the analysis), we divide [0, 1] into the a-intervals 
[0, a), [a, 2a), [2a, 3a), . . . . Denote the kth such interval 
as h = [ka, (k + 1)a). We define the approximation ft 
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to be constant over any a-interval I. Specifically, for any 
z E h. Fi(z) = :Fi(ka). Since t�e derivative of the :Fi is 
bounded by p, we have l:Fi(z)- :Fi(z)l ::; pa for all play­
ers i, bE {0, 1 }, and z E [0, 1]. In the sequel, we shall refer 
to 9 = (S, {(i�,it)};'=1 ) as the a-approximate summa­
rization game for g. 
We first show that the bounded derivatives of the payoff 
functions translates to a Lipschitz-like condition on the ap­
proximate payoff functions. 
Lemma2 For all z, z' E [0,1], 
IFi(z)- :f;(z')l ::; (pjz- z'l + 2pa)B(z- z') 
where we define B(z - z') = 0 if z = z' and B(z - z') = 1 
otherwise. 
Proof: Clearly the difference is 0 if z = z'. If z # z' we 
have 
IFi(z)-Fi(z')l:::; l:Fi(z)-:Fi(z')l+2pa:::; pjz-z'l+2pa 
where the first inequality comes from the approximation 
quality, and the second from the bound on the derivatives 
���. 0 
The following straightforward lemma translates the quality 
of approximate Nash equilibria in 9 back to the original 
game g. 
Lemma 3 Let p be any !'-Nash equilibrium for the a­
approximate summarization game 9. Then pis a (2pa+'Y )­
Nash equilibrium for g, 
Proof: Since p is a ?-Nash equilibrium for 9. each player 
i is playing a ?-best response. The rewards in g can 
change by at most pa for each action, which implies that 
the change to a new best response is at most 2pa +I'. 0 
We next give a lemma that will simplify our arguments 
by letting us define (approximate) best responses solely in 
terms of the single global summarization value S(x), rather 
the multiple local values S(x[i : b]) for each i and b. We 
start with the following definition. 
Definition 1 Let 9 be the a-approximate summarization 
game, and let p be any mixed strategy. We define for player 
i the single-value apparent best response in 9 as 
a;(p) = argmaxbE{O,l} {Ex�v[Fi(S(x))]}. 
Thus, a; (PJ is the apparent best response for i in 9 to p if i 
ignores the effect of his own actions on the summarization 
function. We now show that this apparent best response in 
9 is in fact an approximate best response in 9. 
Lemma 4 Let 9 be the a-approximate summarization 
game. Let p be any mixed strategy. Then a; (p) is a 
( rp + 2pa)-best response for player ito pin 9. 
Proof: For any pure strategy x and any b E {0, 1}, we 
have 
J S(x)- S(x[i: b])l ::; rib- x;l 
due to the bound on influence. Note that the right-hand 
side of this inequality is r if b # x; and 0 if b = x;. By 
Lemma 2, we have 
l.it(S(x))- :Fi(S(i[i: b])l:::; (rp + 2pa)lb - x;J. 
Taking expectations under p gives 
Now if 
a;(PJ # argmaxbE{O,l} {Ex�P" [Jt(S (x[i : b]))]} 
(that is, a; (PJ is not already a true best response to p for i in 
9), then the inequality above implies it is a ( rp+ 2pa)-best 
response. 0 
Now note that by construction, if h is any a-interval, and 
x and X' are any two pure strategies such that S(x) E Ik 
and S (X') E h (that is, both vectors give a value of the 
summarization function lying in the same a-interval), then 
a;(x) = a;(X'), because the approximate payoff functions 
:t; do not change over h. Furthermore, the action a; ( x) 
is an approximate best response fori in 9 by Lemma 4. In 
other words, in 9, we have reduced to a setting in which the 
(approximate) best response of all players can be viewed 
solely as a function of the a-interval h in which S(x) lies, 
and not on the details of x itself. 
For any a-interval h. let us define 
where xis any vector such that S(x) E h. Thus, BR(h) 
is the vector of (apparent) best responses of the players in 
9 when the value of the summarization function falls in h. 
This best response itself gives a value to the summarization 
function, which we define as V(h) = S(BR(h)). We can 
extend this definition to view V as a mapping from [0, 1] 
to [0, 1] (rather than from a-intervals to [0, 1]) by defining 
V(x) to be V(h), where x E h. In Figure I we provide 
a sample plot of a hypothetical V that we shall refer to for 
expository purposes. 
The purpose of the definition of V is made clear by the 
next lemmas. The intuition is that those places where V 
"crosses" the diagonal line y = x are indicative of approx­
imate Nash equilibria. We begin with the easier case in 
which V crosses the diagonal during one of its constant­
valued horizontal segments, marked as the point A in Fig­
ure 1. 
Lemma 5 Let Ik be an a-interval such that V(h) E h. 
Then BR(h) is a (rp + 2pa)-Nash equilibrium for 9. 
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Proof: Let x = BR(h). Since V(h) = S(x) E h. every 
player i is playing Xi = ai(x), and thus by Lemma 4, a 
(Tp + 2pa)-best response to x. D 
We next examine the case where Lemma 5 does not apply. 
First we establish a property of the function V. 
Lemma 6 If for every a-interval h. V(h) !f. h. then 
there exists a k such that V(h-d > ka > V(Ik)· 
Proof: For k = 0 we have V(Io) > 0, and for € = 1/a-1 
(the last interval) we have V(Ie) < 1. Therefore there has 
to be a k for which the lemma holds. D 
In other words, if Lemma 5 does not apply, there must be 
two consecutive intervals whose V-values "drop" across the 
diagonal. This case is illustrated in Figure 1 by the vertical 
dashed line containing the point B. 
Lemma 7 Let k be such that V(h-d > ka > V(h). 
Then there is a pure strategy x which is a (3Tp + 6pa)­
Nash equilibrium in Q. 
Proof: Let fi = BR(h-d and z = BR(lk). Lett be the 
number of indices i for which Yi f. Zi. Define the sequence 
of t vectors x1 , ... , if! such that x1 = fi, if! = z, and for 
every j = 1, . . .  't, xi+1 is obtained from xi by flipping the 
next bit i such Yi f. Zi. Thus, in each xi, bits that have the 
same value in fi and z are unaltered, while bits that differ in 
y and z flip exactly once during the "walk" from x to z. 
The intuition is that if we can find any vector on the walk 
which gives a value to S falling in or near the interval h, 
it must be an approximate Nash equilibrium, since players 
whose best response in this neighborhood of S-values may 
be strongly determined (that is, those for which Yi = Zi) 
are properly set throughout the walk, while the others may 
be set to either value (since they are nearly indifferent in 
this neighborhood, as evidenced by their switching approx­
imate best response values from h-1 to h). In Figure I, 
the points along the vertical line that include B conceptu­
ally show the different values of V during the walk. 
Now for eachj we define vi = S(xi). Due to the bounded 
influence of S, we have that lvi - vH1I � T for all j = 1, ... , t. This implies that for some value£, we have lve -
kal � T. (In Figure 1, point B corresponds to the vector xi 
on the walk whose V-value comes closest to ka, and thus 
constitutes the desired approximate Nash equilibrium.) 
We now show that xi is an approximate Nash equilibrium. 
Consider player i, and assume that xf = 0, but that the best 
response fori is actually 1 (the other cases are similar). If 
ve E h, then xf is a ( Tp+2ap)-best response by Lemma 4. 
Otherwise, ve E h-1· Since 0 = xf is the apparent best 
response for ka, we have 
F{(ka) � Po(ka). 
y 
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' ' 
' ' 
' ' 
' ' 
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� 
Figure I: Hypothetical plot of the function V over the a-intervals 
I k. We view the x-axis as being both a continuum of individual 
points and a discrete sequence of a-intervals. V generally begins 
above the diagonal line y = x, and ends up below the diagonal, 
and thus must cross the diagonal at some point. The point labeled 
A is an example of a horizontal crossing as covered by Lemma 5. 
The column of points including the point labeled B is an exam­
ple of a vertical crossing as covered by Lemma 6. Each point in 
this column indicates a value of S realized on the vector "walk" 
discussed in the proof of Lemma 6, while the point B itself is the 
value of S nearest the diagonal in this walk. The analysis estab­
lishes that (at least) one of these two crossing cases must occur. 
We now bound the difference in the reward to player i due 
to playing action 0 rather than 1 in response to xi, which is 
A o l A o � .F{(S(x [xi: 1])) - .F0(S(x [xi: OJ)). 
This difference is bounded by 
F{(ve)- FQ(ve) + Tp + 2pa 
since ve = S(x1), and by Lemma 2. Again by Lemma 2, 
we have 
IFt(ve)- Fi(ka)l � TP + 2pa. 
Putting it all together gives 
F{(S(xe[xi: 1]))- .tt(S(xe[xi: OJ)) � 3Tp + 6pa. 
Therefore every player is playing a (3Tp + 6pa)-best re­
sponse. D 
Lemma 5 covers the case where V crosses the diagonal hor­
izontally, and Lemma 7 the complementary case where it 
does not. Either case leads to the efficient computation of a 
(3Tp + 6pa)-Nash equilibrium for Q, which by Lemma 3 
is a (3Tp + 8pa)-Nash equilibrium for the original game 
Q. Setting € = Spa or a = €/(8p) completes the proof of 
Theorem 1. 
A description of the algorithm SummNash detailed in the 
above analysis is provided in Figure 2. 
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Algorithm SummNash 
Inputs: Ann-player ( T, p)-summarization game Q = (S, { (.:F0, .:Fl) }f=1 ), and an approximation parame­
ter E. We assume that S and each payoff function .:Fb are provided as black-box subroutines that cost unit 
computation time to call. 
Output: A (3Tp +E)-Nash equilibrium for Q. 
I. ll +- Ej8p. 
2. For each player i = 1, . . .  , n, and b E { 0, 1}, construct the C>-approximate payoff functions fb: for 
every C>-interval Ik = [kll, (k + 1)ll), fi(z) = .:Fi(kll) for all z E h. Note that this requires 1/ll 
evaluations of each .:Fb. 
3. Construct the mapping V by setting V(h) = S(sa(Ik)) for every ll-interval h. 
4. For each C>-interval Ik. k = 1, ... , 1/ll, check if V(h) E h. If so, then output BR(h). 
5. For each C>-interval h. k = 1, ... , 1/ll, check if V(h-1) > kll > V(h). If so: 
(a) Let A be the set of player indices whose play is the same in BR(Ik-l) and BR(Ik)­
(b) B +- {1, . . .  ,n} - A. 
(c) t +- IBI. 
(dJ x' +- sa(h-d. 
(e) For j = 1, ... , t, let xi be obtained from xi-! by flipping the bit corresponding to the next index 
in B. Note that x' = BR(h). 
(f) For j = 1, ... 't, if IS(xi) -kill � p, output xi. 
Figure 2: Algorithm SummNash . 
5 LEARNING IN LINEAR GAMES 
In this section, we propose and analyze a distributed learn­
ing algorithm for the players of a game in which the sum­
marization function S is linear, that is, S(x) = I:�=l WiXi. 
It is easily verified that in such a case that each influence 
Ti = Wi. Our main result is that the learning algorithm con­
verges to an approximate Nash equilibrium for the summa­
rization game g. The analysis will rely heavily on the tools 
developed in Section 4. 
The learning algorithm for each player is rather simple, 
and can be viewed as a variant of smoothed best response 
dynamics (Fudenberg and Levine [ 1999]). First of all, if 
9 = (S, {(F0, Ftl}j=1) is the original (linear) summariza­
tion game, each player i will instead use the a-approximate 
payoff functions fi described in Section 4. Note that these 
approximations can be computed privately by each player. 
We shall use p1 to denote the joint mixed strategy of the 
population at time t in the learning algorithm. In our learn­
ing model, at each round t, the expected value of the sum­
marization function 
is broadcast to all players 2. 
2In the full paper we will examine the variant in which a pure 
strategy xis sampled according top', and all players receive only 
the value S(x). The analysis and results will be similar due to 
large-deviation bounds. 
One natural learning algorithm would call for each player i 
to update Pl in the direction of their apparent best response 
iii(P'). This apparent best response involves expectations 
over p', and therefore requires each player to know this 
distribution to compute iii(P') exactly. However, let us 
extend the definition of apparent best response to apply to 
means rather than complete distributions: 
We can view iii (J.Lt) to be the approximate apparent best 
response for i to p' under the simplifying assumption that 
p' generates a distribution of S(x) that is sharply peaked 
near its mean value J.Lt· Before describing the learning al­
gorithm, we state without proof a standard large deviation 
bound that we shall use in the analysis, establishing that 
this assumption is warranted in large populations. 
LemmaS Let Q (S,{(fj,ftl}j=1) be the a­
approximate summarization game derived from the (T, p)­
summarization game g = (S, { (Fj,Ff)}i=1). Let p be 
any mixed strategy, and let J.L = S(PJ. Then for each 
player i, iii(J.L) is a 'lj;-best response to p in Q, for 'lj; = 
O(pJl::�=l Tllog(1/ JL:;�1 TlJ). 
This lemma actually holds regardless of whether S is lin­
ear, but we shall only apply it to the linear case. Thus, 
for example, if all weights in S are bounded by some con­
stant C times 1/n (C = 1 in the case of straight voting), 
we have 'lj; = O(p log(n)fy'n). Thus, as before we have 
-; 
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improved approximations with larger populations. Note, 
however, that JI:7=
1 rl 2 T = maxi{r;}. 
We now describe the learning algorithm, which has a learn­
ing rate parameter 0 < (3 < 1 and a "stopping" parameter 
S. We view (3 as a small fixed constant, and for the analysis 
will require that (3 < a. At time t, each player i updates 
their mixed strategy slightly in the direction of ai(J.Lt): 
Pi+! = (1- f3)Pi + f3&i(J.Lt). 
If we define BR(J.L) = (al(J.L), ... , an(J.L)), the global vec­
tor update resulting from these distributed updates is 
pt+l = (1- f3)P' + (3BR(J.Lt)· 
If 1Pl+1 - Pll :S 8 for all i, then the learning algorithm is 
terminated; otherwise updates continue for all players. 
We will refer to this distributed learning algorithm as 
SurnrnLearn(S). Note that if 8 > 0, the algorithm re­
quires a single additional bit of global information at each 
step, or the ability for players to "broadcast" if their up­
date was greater than S. For SurnrnLearn(O), no such 
mechanism is necessary, as all players continue updat­
ing forever. Below we shall consider both cases, because 
while SummLearn(O) is more decentralized and there­
fore more natural, we can make a slightly stronger state­
ment in the S > 0 case. Note that SummLearn(O) is sim­
ply an approximate and smoothed version of best-response 
dynamics (Fudenberg and Levine [1999]) - each player 
simply moves their mixed strategy slightly in the direction 
of the best response to a sharply peaked distribution of S 
with the broadcast mean. 
For the analysis, we begin by writing: 
J.Lt+1 = S(pt+1) 
S((1- (3)p1 + (3BR(J.Lt)) 
(1- (3)S(p') + (3S(BR(J.Lt)) 
= (1 - f3)J.Lt + (3S(BR(J.Lt)) 
= (1 - f3)J.Lt + (3V(h) 
where we define h to be the a-interval containing J.Lt, we 
have used the linearity of S, and V is as defined in Sec­
tion 4. The above implies 
J.Lt+l - f.lt = (3(V(h)- J.Lt)· 
In other words, as long as J.Lt < V(h), the distributed 
updates cause the mean to increase, and as long as J.Lt > 
V(Ik), they cause the mean to decrease. Viewed graphi­
cally in Figure 3, the learning dynamics cause the mean to 
move towards the crossing points of the function V ana­
lyzed in Section 4. As before, there are two distinct cases 
of crossing. We now analyze the convergence to the cross­
ings. 
Since (3 < a by choice, we always have IJ.Lt+l - J.Lti :S a. 
This implies that we can only move to adjacent a-intervals: 
y 
�V(I) 
' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' � ' ' ' ' ' ' 
: : ' ' ' ' 
X=I 
Figure 3: Replication of Figure 1, with arrows added along the 
diagonal to illustrate the dynamics of SummLearn(.5). We can 
think of the distributed learning process as generating the move­
ment of the mean Jlt = S(p') along the diagonal. As indicated 
by the arrows, at each point Jlt, if V is above the diagonal, then the 
learning dynamics increase Jlt, and if V is below the diagonal they 
decrease Jlt. Convergence is to crossing points of V. At the point 
labeled C the dynamics reverse direction, and the point labeled D 
indicates a neighborhood where the dynamics do not reverse, but 
may slow down considerably, since V is near the diagonal. 
if J.Lt E h, then J.Lt+l E h-1 U h U h+1· Let us say that 
learning has converged at time T if there exists a vector p * 
such that for all t 2 T we have p' = p*. We first show 
that if learning converges, it must be to an approximate 
Nash equilibrium. This covers two possible outcomes of 
the learning dynamics: convergence to a horizontal cross­
ing point, or convergence to a point on a horizontal segment 
that comes very close to the diagonal (see Figure 3). 
Lemma 9 Suppose learning has converged at time T to 
p*. Then p* is an 0(¢ + pS + pa)-Nash equilibrium in 9. 
Proof: Let J.L* = S(p*). Since the learning has con­
verged, we have l&i(J.L*) - p;'l ::; S for every i. By Lem­
mas 2 and 8, p;' must be a ( ¢ + p8 + 2pa )-best response 
in 9, and thus by Lemma 3, p* is a (¢ + pS + 4pa)-Nash 
equilibrium in 9. D 
Now for any a-interval h, we call a maximal sequence of 
consecutive time steps t with J.Lt E h a visit to interval h. 
The duration of a visit is the number of steps in the visit. 
Lemma 10 The duration of any visit to any a-interval h 
is bounded by (1/ (3) ln(1/S). 
Proof: As long as J.Lt E h. BR(J.Lt) is unchanged, and 
therefore I iff'- BR(J.Lt)lloo is reduced by a factor of 1- (3 
at each step. Solving (1- f3)m ::; S form yields the desired 
bound. D 
The next claim follows immediately from Lemma 10 and 
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the Pigeonhole Principle. 
Lemma 11 Assume that the mean JLt never visits any a­
interval twice. Then SummLearn( 6) converges after at 
most (1/a)(1/f3) ln(1/6) steps. 
The following lemma handles both the case that learning 
never converges, and the case that some interval is visited 
twice. 
Lemma 12 Suppose that at some time T, JLt makes a sec­
ond visit to some a-interval Ik. Then for all t > T', the 
mixed strategies p1 are all 0(1/J + pr + p6 + pa)-Nash 
equilibria for Q, where T' < T + (1/ (3) ln(1/ 6). 
Proof: Let h be the first a-interval visited twice by /Lt. 
and that T is the first step of the second visit. Since (3 < a, 
at time T- 1 we had either /LT-1 E h-1 or /LT-1 E h+1; 
we assume the latter case without loss of generality. Note 
that that since h is the first revisited a-interval, /Lt is mono­
tonically increasing while /Lt E h, and monotonically de­
creasing while JLt E h+1. Thus, for all t > T, we will 
have JLt E h U h+1· 
Consider a player i such that iii(h) = iii(h+ll· After at 
most (1/ (3) ln(1/6) time steps we will have IP/ -iii(h) I ::; 
6. Therefore, as in the proof of Lemma 9, by time T' player 
i will play an 0( 1/J + pa + p6)-best response in g for all t > 
T. For the other playersj such thatiij(h) 'I iij (h+ J ), any 
action is an 0(1/J + pr + pa)-best response for all t > T, 
since JLtEhUlk+1· 0 
For the case 6 > 0, we thus have the following theorem, 
which together with Theorem 15 below constitutes the sec­
ond of our main results. 
Theorem 13 After at most 0((1/a)(1/ (3) log(1/6)) steps, 
SummLearn(6) plays an 0(1/J + pr + p6 + pa)-Nash equi­
librium for all subsequent time steps. 
As in algorithm SummNash, we can make the term 
p6 + pa smaller than any desired£ by choosing 6 = £j2p 
and a = £j2p, with the resulting polynomial dependence 
on 1/£ in the running time. This leaves us with the un­
controllable term 1/J + pr. Again, as we have discussed, in 
many reasonable large-population games we expect these 
influence terms to vanish as n becomes large. Also, note 
that given that we require the learning rate (3 < a, there 
is no benefit to setting (3 much smaller than this, and thus 
the choice (3 = a/2 yields an overall convergence time of 
0((1/a2) log(1/6)). 
We now analyze SummLearn(O). Here we cannot expect 
to upper bound the time it will take to converge to an ap­
proximate Nash equilibrium - technically, if the interval 
h is such that IV (h) - ak I ::; 6, /Lt might stay in h for 
0(log 1/6) steps (see Figure 3). Since 6 can be arbitrary 
small, this time cannot be bounded. However, we can show 
that any time JLt is "near the diagonal", the players are play­
ing an approximate Nash equilibrium. This implies that we 
can bound the number of time steps in which they are not 
playing an approximate Nash equilibrium. 
Lemma 14 Consider a visit of JLt to interval h in the time 
interval t E {t1, . . .  , t2}. For all times 
t E {t1 + (1/f3)ln(l/6), ... ,t2} 
p1 is an (1/J + p6)-Nash equilibrium. 
Proof: As in Lemma 9, after (1/ (3) ln(l/6) steps we have 
IIP1- ii(JLt)lloo ::; 6. Therefore each player is playing a 
0( 1/J + pa + p6)-best response in g. 0 
Since Lemma 12 does not depend on the termination mech­
anism, Lemma 14 and the choice (3 = a/2 implies the fol­
lowing theorem. 
Theorem 15 For any 6 > 0, if SummLearn(O) is run 
for an infinite sequence of steps, the players play an 
0(1/J + pr + p6 + pa)-Nash equilibrium in all but at most 
0((1/a2) ln(l/6)) steps. 
Note that though SummLearn(O) has no dependence on 6 
(only the global summarization mean must be broadcast), 
Theorem 15 provides a spectrum of statements about this 
algorithm parameterized by 6- as we reduce 6, we give 
worse (larger) bounds on the total number of steps that a 
better approximation to equilibrium is played. 
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